http://bcove.me/4xmlo5z2 A short video from Dr. Michio Kaku.
However, Holly Mandel makes a very nuanced point that seems to discredit Dr. Kaku's train of thought:
"[Dr. Kaku] is confusing two different things: (1) The ability of future events to be predicted from current states and (2) The lack of room for agency/free will if everything happens according to physical laws. There is no reason why these two should be treated as the same thing - the fact that something can be predicted doesn't necessarily preclude the possibility of free will and the fact that something can't be predicted doesn't necessarily help the cause of free will. The example he uses demonstrates exactly why: say that certain physical operations are random on a sub-atomic scale (and even say that this randomness can be significant on a macro scale). There's no reason why this randomness implies any freedom in a completely materialist view of things - it just implies that you can't make 100% accurate predictions. So if - to use an exaggerated example - there's a 50% chance that certain physical events will take place causing me to do something evil, and a 50% chance that they won't, there still does not seem to be a whole lot of personal agency involved."
I call BS. Consider it this way- The computer that I'm typing at is made up of countless atoms, each of which is actually moving, and let's say for the sake of argument, in a way that is completely random. Theoretically, it's possible that my computer could move in a noticeable way, but realistically, not really- it's effectively the same as repeatedly flipping trillions of coins and trying to deviate from the mean with some significance. Same with quantum particles, although considering their size, the example I mention is only amplified.
ReplyDeleteSo yeah, the state of the future can never be known with exact certainty, but it can to a point with an extremely minimal point of error. (Which is why the rules of classical physics still hold.)
Yes, it is true that classical physics can be considered the average of quantum mechanical phenomena on our macroscale. In other words, classical physics is a special case of quantum mechanics in the limit of high energies and large mass. However, over long periods of time these quantum fluctuations from the average can deviate appreciably, leading to a large range of possible outcomes (for example, the way our universe turned out is one possibility out of infinitely many others that could have formed). Your example of atoms in a computer is not really a fair example here because it concerns a specific case where they are confined to a solid, and thus have a pretty limited range of motion. Even so, the wave functions that describe these particles offer a probability distribution of where they can exist. But the overall point is that, regardless how close we can get to accurate predictions of the future or the past, these predictions will always involve a certain degree of uncertainty due to the inherent randomness of nature.
ReplyDeleteWhat up, Colito?
ReplyDeleteThis guy is confusing two different things: (1) The ability of future events to be predicted from current states and (2) The lack of room for agency/free will if everything happens according to physical laws. There is no reason why these two should be treated as the same thing - the fact that something can be predicted doesn't necessarily preclude the possibility of free will and the fact that something can't be predicted doesn't necessarily help the cause of free will. The example he uses demonstrates exactly why: say that certain physical operations are random on a sub-atomic scale (and even say that this randomness can be significant on a macro scale). There's no reason why this randomness implies any freedom in a completely materialist view of things - it just implies that you can't make 100% accurate predictions. So if - to use an exaggerated example - there's a 50% chance that certain physical events will take place causing me to do something evil, and a 50% chance that they won't, there still does not seem to be a whole lot of personal agency involved.
That is a really great point. I still think that the randomness of nature precludes determinism, but you have brought to light that this in turn does not require that there be free will. The implications of the simultaneity of no determinism and no free will are pretty mindboggling.
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